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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 
(2001). 
ISSUE TO BE REVIEWED 
Did the trial court act within its discretion in dismissing Appellant Phillip Coxey's 
lawsuit for failure to disclose a videotape he intended to use as an exhibit during the 
second trial in this matter, "[g]iven the potential irreversible prejudice to defendant, the 
fact that plaintiff was allowed a second chance at his case through the granting of a new 
trial, the timing of the revelation of the videotape, the lack of good reason or excuse for 
not producing the videotape and the inequity of allowing plaintiff the equitable remedy of 
a new trial when they stood before the court with unclean hands . . . ?" (R. 866). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL 
The issue set forth above was preserved at R. 923-26 and 1071. However, the 
issue Mr. Coxey proposes for appeal was not preserved for this Court's review. Mr. 
Coxey asks this Court to consider whether dismissal was appropriate under the 1999 
version of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37 "when there was no violation of a court order 
[and] where Rule 37(f) does not apply to the case . . . . " (Appellant's Brief, p. 1). In 
arguing against dismissal of his case for failure to disclose the crucial videotape, 
Mr. Coxey never suggested to the trial court that the 1999 version of Rule 37 applied, nor 
did he suggest the rule was not applicable in the absence of a court order. (R. 923-26; 
1071, pp. 240-95). 
1 
Appellate courts will not consider issues or arguments raised for the first time on 
appeal. Timm v. Dewsnup, 86 P3d 699 (Utah 2003); Coombs v. Juice Works 
Development, Inc., 81 P.3d 769 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). As explained below, even if he 
had presented these arguments before the trial court, there were still ample grounds for 
the court to exercise its discretion to dismiss his case. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Mr. Coxey acknowledges that this issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 1). As the court in Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) noted, 
[management of the actions pending before it is uniquely the business of the trial 
court and while an appellate court may, of course, intervene if discretion is abused, 
we accord trial courts considerable latitude in this regard and considerable 
deference to their determinations regarding discovery. 
Schoney, 790 P.2d at 585. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES ON APPEAL 
Three rules are determinative on appeal, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 37(f), 
41(b) and 60(b)(6). These rules are attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
1. The Parties Presented This Case to a Jury, Resulting in a No-Cause 
Verdict for the Eagles. 
This case arises from a May 30, 1997 incident in which Appellant Mr. Coxey 
claims he was electrocuted at a campground owned and operated by Appellee Fraternal 
Order of Eagles ("Eagles"). (R. 1-3). The parties participated in a four-day jury trial in 
2 
June 2002, during which Mr. Coxey was permitted to present his entire case to the jury. 
(R. 213). The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Eagles, finding that the Eagles was 
not negligent as alleged by Mr. Coxey. (R. 232-33). The trial court entered judgment on 
the jury verdict. (R. 232-33). 
2. The Trial Court Granted Mr. Coxey a New Trial Because Mr. Coxey 
Claimed Unfair Surprise at the Testimony of an Expert. 
Unhappy with the jury's rejection of his case, Mr. Coxey moved the trial court for 
a new trial on several bases. He contended that he was entitled to a new trial because a 
juror allegedly fell asleep during proceedings, then he accused the Eagles' paralegal of 
talking to jurors during the trial.1 (R. 277-78). He also complained that the Eagles 
unfairly surprised him by calling a supposedly unanticipated expert witness to testify on 
the issue of proximate cause. (R. 273-76). The trial court granted Mr. Coxey a new trial 
on the basis that the Eagles should have supplemented its discovery responses to give 
more information about the expert witness. (R. 398-99). Even though the Eagles had 
twice disclosed the expert witness before trial, the trial court was persuaded that the 
failure to fully disclose the expert's opinion via supplementation of discovery responses 
created confusion for Mr. Coxey. (R. 397-99). The trial court did not conclude that the 
Eagles acted with willfulness or fault, instead stating that "there had been a breakdown in 
communication that may have resulted in possible prejudice to plaintiff." (R. 859). 
*Mr. Coxey only raised these matters after the verdict came in against him. 
3 
The trial court ordered a new trial solely on the ground that there had been a failure 
to disclose information in discovery. (R. 674). The court noted that the second trial was 
granted "to correct a fairly narrowly defined error" - - to allow Mr. Coxey to depose the 
expert witness and "otherwise retry the case as the first case had been tried." (R. 1070, p. 
239; 859). Indeed, the court ruled at the pretrial conference the week before the second 
trial that no new evidence could be introduced at the second trial beyond evidence 
pertaining to the Eagles' expert witness. (R. 1069, pp. 1-17). 
3. At the Second Trial, Mr. Coxey Attempted to Use Photographs from a 
Videotape He Failed to Disclose During Discovery. 
Before the second trial, Mr. Coxey retained a new attorney. (R. 859). The second 
trial, now nearly seven years after the incident, began on February 23, 2004. (R. 666). 
On the first day of the second trial, Mr. Coxey's new attorney stated that he intended to 
offer photographs of the campground that had never been disclosed to the Eagles in 
discovery. (R. 859). The Eagles had sent discovery requests to Mr. Coxey in early 1999 
asking for "[a]ll photographs available to, or in the possession of, the Coxeys, showing 
the campground, or any aspect of the electrical system of the campground as well as any 
photographs showing the trailer or any of the cord involved in the incident." (R. 679-80). 
The Eagles also asked Mr. Coxey in discovery requests to provide "[a]ny and all 
photographs available to or in the possession of the Coxeys showing marks left on 
Mr. Coxey's person after the incident." (R. 679). 
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The photographs Mr. Coxey sought to introduce at the second trial were not ones 
he had disclosed in discovery, but were still photographs taken from a videotape of the 
campground made on May 31, 1997, the day after the alleged electrocution. (R. 1071, 
250-51). Mr. Coxey never disclosed the existence of the videotape to the Eagles during 
discovery. (R. 670-71). 
4. Mr. Coxey's Failure to Disclose the Videotape Prejudiced the Eagles in 
Several Ways, 
The videotape depicted several critical pieces of evidence.2 (R. 859). First, Mr. 
Coxey was in the video, not in any apparent physical or mental distress the day after the 
incident, despite claiming that he has sustained a disabling head injury as a result of the 
electrical shock. (R. 673). Had Mr. Coxey disclosed the videotape before trial, the 
Eagles would have had an opportunity to play it for their medical experts and have them 
testify at trial to his physical and mental status hours after an alleged electrocution. (R. 
673). 
Second, the videotape purported to document Mr. Coxey's physical injuries from 
the electrocution and contained much clearer images of Mr. Coxey's left arm than the 
photographs he had provided during discovery. (R. 671). These images were important 
to the Eagles, since the Eagles contested that the marks on Mr. Coxey's arm were 
produced by electrical energy. (R. 671-72). The videotape showed minor scrapes on Mr. 
2It bears noting that Mrs. Coxey testified in her deposition that on the night of the 
incident Mr. Coxey retained the counsel who represented him at the first trial. The very 
next day, the Coxeys made the videotape. 
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Coxey's arm, and had Mr. Coxey properly disclosed the videotape during discovery, the 
Eagles could have played the videotape for flie emergency loom nurse who treated 
Mr. Coxey after the alleged incident, to have her confirm that the scrapes shown on the 
videotape were the scrapes she recalled seeing at the emergency room.3 (R. 673). 
Additionally, Mr. Coxey's attorney told the jury during opening statements that 
Mr. Coxey received a welt on his head from the electrocution. (R. 1070, p. 142; 1071, p. 
243). However, the videotape did not show his head, which was curious given the fact 
that the videotape was taken in part to document his injuries. (R. 1071, p. 243-44). The 
Eagles would have had an opportunity to explore this curiosity had the videotape been 
properly disclosed. (R. 1071, p. 244). 
Third, the videotape showed Mr. Coxey's trailer and the trailer next to it at the 
campground. (R. 672). The adjacent trailer was plugged into the same electrical outlet 
on which Mr. Coxey claims he was electrocuted. (R. 672, 859). The license plate of the 
other trailer is visible in the videotape. (R. 672, 859). The Eagles had been unable to 
locate any witnesses from the campground, but it could have used the license plate of the 
adjacent trailer to track down the owner, interview him and test his trailer to see if it 
might have been the source of the grounding problem. (R. 672, 859-60). The owner of 
3Sometime before the second trial, the emergency room nurse moved out of state, 
and one of the Eagles' caretakers at the campground died. (R. 860). Thus, two witnesses 
who could provide potentially helpful testimony to the Eagles regarding the videotape 
were unavailable by February of 2004, when Mr. Coxey disclosed it at the second trial. 
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that trailer likely would have been able to testify about the condition of the electrical 
system and the absence of any problem with the outlet. (R. 672). 
Finally, Mrs. Coxey was narrating the videotape. Had the videotape been made 
available when the Eagles deposed her and her husband, the Eagles could have questioned 
them about it. (R. 673). As it was, the Eagles questioned the Coxeys during their 
depositions about the existence of any photographs showing the campsite, and neither 
revealed that they had taken a videotape of the campsite the day after the incident. (R. 
860). 
5. The Trial Court Granted the Eagles' Motion to Dismiss the Case Based 
on Willful Failure to Disclose Crucial Evidence. 
After opening statements and testimony from one witness, the court called a recess 
to allow the parties to research the issue of how to handle Mr. Coxey's nondisclosure of 
the videotape and to give his new counsel an opportunity to contact his first counsel to 
find out why it had never been disclosed. (R. 860). The court held a hearing on the 
motion later that day. (R. 1071). 
At the hearing, the Eagles moved for dismissal of the case on several alternative 
grounds. First, the Eagles requested relief from the order granting a new trial based on 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), which effectively would reinstate the original jury 
verdict in the Eagles' favor. (R. 1071, p. 268). This rule permits a trial court, "in the 
furtherance of justice" to grant relief from an order for "any . . . reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment." 
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Alternatively, the Eagles asked for a dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
41(b), which allows involuntary dismissal for a plaintiffs failure to comply with the 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 1071, pp. 268-69). As a third potential basis for relief, the 
Eagles asked for dismissal as a discovery sanction under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37. 
(R. 1071, p. 244). Rule 37(f) states that 
[i]f a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required by 
Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1)... that party shall not be permitted to use the witness, 
document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless 
or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu 
of this sanction, the court may order any other sanction, including . . . any order 
permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C)) 
Subpart (b)(2)(C) provides for the sanction of "dismissing the action or proceeding or any 
part thereof. . . . ." 
The Eagles' counsel noted that the relief sought would not "deny Mr. Coxey a 
right to a trial. What we're doing is pulling back the privilege of a second trial, and 
pulling it back from someone that's demonstrated he wasn't deserving of that privilege." 
(R. 1071, p. 276). 
Mr. Coxey's second attorney proferred at the hearing that he had been able to 
speak with Mr. Coxey's first lawyer about the videotape. (R. 860; 1071, pp. 278-79). 
Mr. Coxey's first counsel "had received the videotape from his clients early in the case 
but decided that it was not admissible and simply shelved it." (R. 860; 1071, pp. 278-79). 
Neither the first counsel nor Mr. Coxey was present at the hearing to answer questions by 
the court or testify as to their explanation of events. (R. 861). 
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After argument by counsel, the court granted the motion for dismissal under Rules 
37,41 and 60(b)(6). (R. 1071, pp. 292-93). Explaining its decision, the court noted the 
irony that Mr. Coxey's first counsel had demanded a new trial "crying unfairness and 
surprise so vigorously . . . and now we find out that he sat on this [videotape] for five, six 
years, we're seven years into this and now it suddenly surfaces . . . . " (R. 1071,pp. 251-
52). The failure to disclose the videotape was "at a minimum the result of willful 
conduct on the part of plaintiff s first counsel. . . ." (R. 861; 1071, pp. 287-88). 
The trial court conceded that its decision to grant a second trial had been a 
"borderline decision," while Mr. Coxey5 s failure to disclose the videotape was an 
"egregious, extreme violation of the rules." (R. 1071, p. 285; 864). Had it known after 
the first trial that Mr. Coxey had withheld the videotape, it likely would not have granted 
his request for a second trial. (R. 862). The trial court summarized its decision by 
stating: 
To now stand before the court accused of withholding material evidence in the 
case for nearly seven years through a second trial when they availed themselves of 
the equity and mercy of the court in asking for a new trial based on far less 
egregious violations of the discovery rules is unconscionable They simply 
stand with unclean hands before the court after having been given an opportunity 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DISMISSING MR. COXEY'S CLAIM. 
Mr. Coxey is asking this Court for a third trial in this case. The parties tried the 
case fully to a jury in 2002, and the jury returned a verdict in the Eagles' favor. 
Mr. Coxey convinced the trial court to give him a second chance with a jury by 
complaining that the Eagles had not formally designated a witness. When the court 
learned during the second trial that Mr. Coxey was guilty of a far more serious discovery 
violation himself, it acted within its discretion by dismissing his case. The justice system 
has given Mr. Coxey his full and fair day in court, and the trial court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
A. The Trial Court had Broad Discretion to Deal with Discovery 
Violations. 
Trial courts have long enjoyed wide latitude in deciding whether to impose 
sanctions upon parties for discovery violations, and in choosing what those sanctions 
should be. This Court explained the need for trial courts to determine "the most fair and 
efficient manner to conduct court business" in Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 
P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997). Since trial judges deal first hand with the parties and the 
discovery process, they have superior understanding of the parties' motives, attitudes and 
credibility and are in the best position to decide how a discovery violation should be 
treated. Morton, 938 P.2d at 274-75. 
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To impose a discovery sanction, the trial court must first find willfulness, bad faith 
or fault on the fault of the noncomplying party. Id. at 274. "To find that a party's 
behavior has been willful, there need only be 'any intentional failure as distinguished 
from involuntary noncompliance.'" Id. at 276, quoting Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
768 P.2d 950, 961 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The trial court in this case found that there was 
a willful failure to disclose a crucial piece of evidence because Mr. Coxey's first counsel 
knew about the videotape, yet failed to identify it during discovery. The representation by 
Mr. Coxey's second counsel that his first counsel determined the videotape was not useful 
is irrelevant. The Eagles asked for any photographs during discovery. They asked for 
photographs in written discovery and in depositions. Mr. Coxey did not produce the 
videotape even though he, his wife and his first counsel were fully aware of it. The 
deliberate nature of the nondisclosure is magnified here, because when Mr. Coxey's first 
counsel demanded a new trial due to the Eagles' alleged discovery violation, he knew of 
the videotape and knew he had not given it to the Eagles. 
Once the trial court finds a willful violation, "[t]he choice of an appropriate 
discovery sanction is primarily the responsibility of the trial judge." First Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n. v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984). An appellate court will 
only overturn a trial judge's choice of sanction if there is "an erroneous conclusion of law 
or . . . no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling." Morton, 938 P.2d at 274-75, 
quoting Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996). The court did not make any 
11 
errors of law, relying on its equitable power as the manager of the trial and the Rules of 
Civil Procedure to choose flie sanction that best fit the circumstances. 
The trial court also had ample evidentiary basis for a dismissal. The trial court 
justified its choice of dismissal as a sanction on the following grounds: (1) the videotape 
contained highly relevant information that the Eagles could have used to bolster its 
defense, and the Eagles were therefore prejudiced by not learning of the videotape until 
the second trial; (2) Mr. Coxey was only in the position of presenting his case to the jury a 
second time due to a "borderline decision" of the trial court; (3) Mr. Coxey did not reveal 
the existence of the videotape until the first day of the second trial4; (4) Mr. Coxey had no 
good excuse for not producing the videotape to the Eagles; and (5) the second trial was 
not meant to be an opportunity for Mr. Coxey to bring in evidence that was not admitted 
during the first trial, beyond evidence pertaining to the Eagles' expert witness. (R. 866, 
1071,pp.247-48).5 
4Mr. Coxey's first counsel knew of the videotape shortly after it was taken. Mr. 
Coxey's second counsel represented that he found out about the videotape a week before 
the second trial. (R. 1071, pp. 244-45). 
5The trial court stated that "I never would have granted a new trial had I 
anticipated that there was going to be this kind of approach taken . . . where there were 
efforts to bring in new evidence . . . . I didn't see this as an opportunity to correct those 
[strategic mistakes by Mr. Coxey's first counsel] by granting a new t r i a l . . . . " 
(R. 1071, pp. 247-48). 
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The trial court acted well within its discretion in concluding that Mr. Coxey should 
be sanctioned for his willful discovery violation, and in choosing dismissal as that 
sanction. This court should uphold its decision. 
B. Rule 37 was an Appropriate Legal Basis for Dismissal, 
Mr. Coxey's main contention on appeal is that the trial court incorrectly relied on 
the 1999 version of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, which was enacted the year after he 
filed his lawsuit. He never raised this argument before the trial court, depriving the trial 
court of the opportunity to consider what effect, if any, that argument should have on its 
ruling. It is well-settled that appellate courts will not consider issues or arguments on 
appeal that have not been raised before the trial court. 
However, even if he had made this argument below, it would not have affected the 
outcome. Mr. Coxey violated both the prior version of Rule 37 and the 1999 version. 
The text of Rule 37 that Mr. Coxey attached as Addendum A to his appellate brief is 
ostensibly the version he claims should apply to his case. That version (and the version in 
place at trial) provides that if a party fails to answer interrogatories, the trial court may 
take certain actions against that party. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d) (1987).6 One 
of the actions the trial court can take is to "dismiss[] the action or proceeding or any part 
thereof...." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C) (1987). Contrary to Mr. 
Coxey's assertion on appeal, violation of a court order is not a prerequisite to imposing 
6An evasive or incomplete answer is considered a failure to answer. Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 37(a)(3) (1987). 
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sanctions under the version of Rule 37 he contends is applicable. See Hales v. Oldroyd, 
999 P.2d 588,592 (Utah Ct App. 2000) (Rule 37(d) does not require violation of a court 
order, nor does it require a complete failure to comply with discovery); Preston & 
Chambers, P.C. v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (dismissal of a 
counterclaim was authorized under Rule 37(d) in the absence of a specific order 
compelling discovery). 
Mr. Coxey also violated the version of Rule 37 that was in effect when the 
majority of discovery occurred in this case and that is in effect now. Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(f) (1999) states that a party who does not disclose requested information 
cannot use that information at trial unless the failure to disclose is harmless and the party 
shows good cause for the failure to disclose. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(f) (1999). 
In addition, the court may impose the sanction of dismissal. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
37(b)(2)(C) (1999). The trial court determined that the failure to disclose the videotape 
prejudiced the Eagles in the defense of the case, and that Mr. Coxey had no good reason 
for withholding the videotape. (R. 864-66). Under either version of Rule 37, the trial 
court exercised appropriate discretion in dismissing Mr. Coxey5s case. 
C. Alternatively. Rule 4Kb) or Rule 60(b)(6) Provides Grounds for 
Dismissal, 
Mr. Coxey gives the false impression that the trial court dismissed his case by 
relying solely on Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37. The trial court actually had three 
alternative legal bases for its decision to grant the Eagles' motion to dismiss. (R. 1071, p. 
14 
293). The trial court primarily cited Rule 37 in its written Decision and Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice, but it also noted during the hearing that it had discretion to 
dismiss the case under either Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b) or 60(b)(6). Either of 
these rules provides an alternative sound basis for dismissal of the case. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) pertains to dismissal of cases and allows 
involuntary dismissal of a plaintiffs lawsuit for failure to abide by the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 60(b)(6) permits a trial court to grant relief from an order when the 
circumstances justify it. Here, the Eagles requested relief from the court's 2003 Order for 
New Trial. (R. 402-03). Either alternative ground would have met the purpose of 
sanctioning Mr. Coxey for willful disclosure of a key document. 
D. Dismissal Was Not Too Harsh a Sanction for Mr, Coxey's Misbehavior, 
Hoping to reverse the sound and thorough decision of the trial judge with semantic 
quibbling, Mr. Coxey argues that even if the court acted within its discretion in 
sanctioning him for his misconduct, dismissing his case was too extreme given "the 
possibility for distinguishing between a photograph and a videotape." (Brief of 
Appellant, p. 5). He claims that the Eagles' discovery requests for photographs of the 
campground were not requests for videotapes of the campground, so his first counsel was 
entirely justified in keeping the videotape of the campground under his hat. 
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Mr. Coxey's second counsel dissolved any alleged technical distinction between 
"photograph" and "videotape"7 by taking still images from flie videotape and proposing to 
introduce them in evidence as photographs. The trial court also disposed of this 
argument by observing that a photograph is an image and a videotape is a series of 
images; "to distinguish a videotape from a photograph is just I think hyper technical and 
is not in keeping with the intent of the Rules of Civil Procedure where full disclosure is 
supposed to be taking place." (R. 1071, pp. 287-88). 
Mr. Coxey willfully withheld a videotape containing vital information that would 
be helpful to the Eagles, then expected to show photographs from this videotape at his 
second trial in support of his case. The only reason he had a second trial was that he 
convinced the court a jury's verdict should be vacated because of miscommunication over 
a defense expert. Dismissal was not too harsh a remedy for this conduct. 
Utah appellate courts have respected trial courts' decisions to dismiss cases for 
discovery misconduct. In Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the 
Court of Appeals upheld a default against a party in a divorce proceeding for failure to 
disclose assets in discovery. The court in Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App. 
7Mr. Coxey cited one 1988 Texas appellate court case where the court found that a 
request for production of photographs did not include a request for a videotape. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 7). However, as Mr. Coxey acknowledges, the Texas Rules of Civil 
Procedure in effect when the case was decided treated photographs and videotapes as 
"two separate items of types of documents." (Appellant's Brief, p. 7). The Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure make no such distinction. Additionally, the court in the later case of 
Crawford v. Deets, 828 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. App. 1992), ruled that a discovery request 
by appellees for production of all "photographs" obligated the appellants to include 
videotapes in their production. 
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1992), affirmed the dismissal of a medical malpractice case on the ground that the 
plaintiff identified new witnesses shortly before trial. See also Schoney v. Memorial 
Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (factors within court's discretion to 
dismiss case included untimeliness of plaintiffs' discovery responses, which prejudiced 
plaintiff; age of case; and narrow escape from summary judgment earlier in the case); 
W. W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977) 
(affirming case dismissal due to plaintiffs persistent failure to respond in timely manner 
to discovery requests); Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410 (Utah 1964) 
(defendant's refusal to produce requested records supporting defendant's claim warranted 
default judgment). 
Mr. Coxey has not offered any compelling argument that would justify disturbing 
the trial court's discretionary decision to dismiss his case. This Court should affirm the 
dismissal. 
SHOULD THIS COURT GRANT 
A THIRD TRIAL, THAT TRIAL MUST BE LIMITED 
TO THE EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES PERMITTED 
AT THE SECOND TRIAL. 
Demonstrating that he would attempt to misuse the extraordinary privilege of a 
third trial, Mr. Coxey claims that if this Court reverses the trial court, the third trial should 
be an unmitigated free-for-all, where new witnesses and evidence could be presented. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9). The trial court correctly limited the scope of the second trial 
to the evidence in the first trial, plus evidence Mr. Coxey needed to put on to cross-
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examine or rebut the Eagles' expert witness. A new trial is not meant to give the parties 
an opportunity to remedy past mistakes or deficiencies in their cases. If this Court 
reversed and remanded with instructions that the third trial would be open to new 
evidence, the Eagles would be forced to engage in another lengthy and expensive round 
of discovery; it would also be tempted to designate its own additional witnesses, resulting 
in a never-ending circle of discovery that would serve no benefit to the parties or the 
court. Should this Court determine the trial court abused its broad discretion in 
dismissing Mr. Coxey's case, it should not permit the third trial to become a circus. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Coxey has had his day in court, and he gained a second day in court through 
behavior approaching subterfuge. This Court should refuse his request for a third day in 
court because, as the trial court aptly put it, "'enough is enough' and . . . it is time to 
simply terminate this case by dismissal." (R. 866). 
DATED this ay of September, 2004. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
(Ijfhn R. Lund 
^-<fulianne P. Blanch 
Attorneys for Appellee Fraternal Order of the 
Eagles 
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Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; 
sanctions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery A party, upon 
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected 
thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as 
follows 
(a)(1) Appropriate court An application for an order to a 
party may be made to the court in which the action is pending, 
or, on matters relating to a deposition, to the court in the 
district where the deposition is being taken An application for 
an order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the 
court in the district where the deposition is being taken 
(a)(2) Motion 
(a)(2)(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by 
Rule 26(a), any other party may move to compel disclosure and 
for appropriate sanctions The motion must mclude a certifi-
cation that the movant has in good faith conferred or at-
tempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure in 
an effort to secure the disclosure without court action 
(a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question pro-
pounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or 
other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 
31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted 
under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for 
inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit 
inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for 
an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order 
compelling inspection in accordance with the request The 
motion must include a certification that the movant has in 
good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or 
party failing to make the discovery in an effort to secure the 
information or material without court action When taking a 
deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the question 
may complete or adjourn the examination before applying for 
an order 
(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response 
For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or incomplete 
disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a failure to 
disclose, answer, or respond 
(a)(4) Expenses and sanctions 
(a)(4)(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or 
requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed, the 
court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or 
deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party 
or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the 
moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining 
the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that 
the motion was filed without the movant's first making a good 
faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court 
action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or 
objection was substantially justified or that other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust 
(a)(4)(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any 
protective order authonzed under Rule 26(c) and shall, after 
opportunity for heanng, require the moving party or the 
attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay to the 
party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable 
expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney 
fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was 
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an 
award of expenses unjust 
(a)(4)(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, 
the court may enter any protective order authorized under 
Rule 26(c) and may, after opportunity for hearing, apportion 
the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion 
among the parties and persons m a just manner 
(b) Failure to comply with order 
(b)(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is 
taken If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question 
after being directed to do so by the court in the district m 
which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be 
considered a contempt of that court 
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending If a 
party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a 
person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on 
behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit 
discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of 
this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered 
under Rule 16(b), the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and 
among others the following 
(b)(2XA) an order that the matters regarding which the 
order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to 
be established for the purposes of the action in accordance 
with the claim of the party obtaining the order, 
(b)(2XB) an order refusmg to allow the disobedient party to 
support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibit-
ing him from introducing designated matters in evidence, 
(b)(2)(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, 
staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismiss-
ing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendenng 
a judgment by default against the disobedient party, 
(b)(2)(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition 
thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to 
obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical or 
mental examination, 
(b)(2)(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order 
under Rule 35(a), such orders as are listed in Paragraphs (A), 
(B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless the party failing to 
comply is unable to produce such person for examination 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, 
the court shall require the party failing to obey the order or 
the attorney or both of them to pay the reasonable expenses, 
including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless the court 
finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit If a party fails to admit the 
genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as 
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the 
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document 
or the truth of the matter, the party requesting the admissions 
may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party 
to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, 
including reasonable attorney fees The court shall make the 
order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objection-
able pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of 
no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit 
had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the 
matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to 
admit 
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(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or se\ 
answers to interrogatories or respond to request for inspectu 
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a pai 
or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to test 
on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who 
to take the deposition, after being served with a proper noti 
or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories subm 
ted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatorit 
or (3) to serve a written response to a request for inspecti 
submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the requei 
the court in which the action is pending on motion may mal 
such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and amoi 
others it may take any action authorized under Paragrapl 
(A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of ai 
order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the par 
failing to act or the party's attorney or both to pay tl 
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by tl 
failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substaj 
tially justified or that other circumstances make an award < 
expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not l 
excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectioi 
able unless the party failing to act has applied for a protectiv 
order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plat 
If a party or attorney fails to participate in good faith in th 
framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is required b, 
Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing 
require such party or attorney to pay to any other party th 
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by th< 
failure. 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness 
document or other material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rules 
26(eXD, or to amend a prior response to discovery as requirec 
by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the 
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the 
failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause 
for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this 
sanction, the court may order any other sanction, including 
payment of reasonable costs and attorney fees, any order 
permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the 
jury of the failure to disclose. 
ule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(aXD By plaintiff Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of 
ile 66(i), and of any applicable statute, an action may be 
smissed by the plaintiflf without order of court by filing a 
•tice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse 
Lrty of an answer or other response to the complaint permit-
d under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of 
9missalf the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a 
tice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the 
erits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any 
mrt of the United States or of any state an action based on or 
eluding the same claim. 
taH2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a 
>tice of dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of 
is rule, an action may only be dismissed at the request of the 
a*ntilTon order of the court based either on: 
(a)«2Ki) a stipulation of all of the parties who have ap-
ared in the action; or 
(a)« 2)( ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems 
oper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant 
ior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to 
;miss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defen-
nt's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending 
• independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise 
ecified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is 
thout prejudice. 
b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof For failure of the 
rintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any 
ler of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action 
of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action 
*d by the court without a jury, has completed the presenta-
n of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to 
;r evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may 
ve for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the 
' the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier 
he facts may then determine them and render judgment 
inst the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment 
ii the close of ail the evidence. If the court renders 
gment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall 
ce findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in 
3rder for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this 
•, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
roper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates 
n adjudication upon the merits. 
) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
n. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any 
iterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary 
lissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of 
division (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
ding is served or, if there is none, before the introduction 
idence at the trial or hearing. 
i Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who 
once dismissed an action in any court commences an 
n based upon or including the same claim against the 
1
 defendant, the court may make such order for the 
lent of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may 
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until 
laintiff has complied with the order. 
Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. 
Id a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-
, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (aXIXi) 
, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, 
)nd or undertaking filed in support of such provisional 
ly must thereupon be delivered by the court to the 
?e party against whom such provisional remedy was 
ed. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistaken. Clerical mistakes in judgments, or-
der* at i ther parti of the record and errors therein arising 
Irom oversight or omission may be corrected by the *ourt at 
any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, aa the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and 
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discov-
ered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as 
are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discov-
ered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), mis-
representation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, re-
leased, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion bhall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 
3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered 
or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect 
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule 
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent 
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding 
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
